Haiti
The March 2026 UN OHCHR report confirms no structural reversal from the GSF deployment: gangs hold territory covering one in four Haitians, government operations produce more civilian casualties than gang violence, and MSS remains below 40% of its mandated strength.
PF Score
3
▲1Authority
2
Reach
4
Under construction
The March 2026 UN OHCHR report confirms no structural reversal from the GSF deployment: gangs hold territory covering one in four Haitians, government operations produce more civilian casualties than gang violence, and MSS remains below 40% of its mandated strength.
State operations cause more civilian deaths than gang violence itself.
Nominal UN participation is Haiti's only residual external presence.
No adversarial relationships
The GSF's initial deployment represents a marginal but meaningful shift in Haiti's security trajectory — the first externally mandated force with direct arrest authority — but the structural conditions that doomed its predecessor (funding gaps, insufficient manpower, institutional dysfunction) remain unresolved.
Gran Grif's repeated high-casualty operations in the Artibonite with no effective interdiction confirms a structural widening of the gap between Haiti's nominal sovereignty and actual territorial control.
Haiti's security situation has structurally deteriorated: gangs now govern territory covering one in four Haitians, and the state's escalatory response — including privatized drone warfare — is producing more civilian casualties than gang violence itself without reversing territorial loss.